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force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, govern-
ment-fearing individuals is to humiliate it and degrade it.""
Bill Neal
Libel: The New York Times Standard in
Reports of Judicial Proceedings
The plaintiff Jones was involved in a judicial proceeding both as a party
and as an attorney.' The Pine Bluff Commercial covered the proceedings and
published articles on three successive days concerning the progress of the case.
The plaintiff sued the newspaper for libel, complaining that the articles were
an attack upon his personal integrity, "had a natural tendency to degrade him,
to expose him to public ridicule and disgrace and to deprive him of that public
confidence necessary to the successful practice of his profession."2 The trial
court rendered judgment for the defendant. In his request for reversal the plain-
tiff argued that the trial court had erred in submitting defendant's tendered
instructions which required a finding of actual malice as a prerequisite to plain-
tiff's recovery.' Held, reversed: The giving of the instructions requiring proof
of actual malice as a basis of recovery constituted prejudicial error. Jones v.
Commercial Printing Co., 463 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1971).
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFAMATION LAW
Defamation law dates back as far as the ancient law of Moses, in which it
was expressly forbidden to slander a person, although no punishment for the
wrong seems to have been specified.4 Through subsequent development of the
law punishments were established that were commonly of a penal rather than
a remedial nature By the end of the seventeenth century, however, libel came
73 1n re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
'The plaintiff, a practicing attorney in Pine Bluff and an organizer of the Pine Bluff
National Bank, joined with three other organizers in filing a petition seeking an order al-
lowing them to inspect the bank's financial records.
'Jones v. Commercial Printing Co., 463 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ark. 1971). The plaintiff
further complained that the newspaper added comments and insinuations of its own and
published all testimony, arguments, and rulings derogatory to plaintiff, but failed to pub-
lish the further testimony, arguments, and rulings vindicating him. Id.
' The defendant's instructions were based upon the holdings in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969).
The plaintiff's tendered instructions, based upon the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 611
(1938), stated that "[t]he publication of a report of judicial proceedings . . . is privileged,
although it contains matter which is false and defamatory, if it is (a) accurate and com-
plete or a fair abridgment of such proceedings, and (b) not made solely for the purpose
of causing harm to the person defamed." 463 S.W.2d at 94.
4 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 1 (1969).
'The libel law of the Athenians provided for payment of a fine to both the injured per-
son and the public treasury. Roman libel law, in certain instances, provided for a severe
beating with a club. M. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 5-7 (2d ed. 1898). The most op-
pressive punishments meted out in libel convictions were, however, those of the infamous
Star Chamber. These included imprisonment, pillory (stocks), fines, whippings, loss of ears,
and brands on the face. Id. at 24.
During the Tudor and Stuart regimes in England freedom of the press and speech was
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to be viewed by the courts not only as a criminal action, but also as an action
in tort.' In the tort action false or defamatory statements published without
sufficient cause or excuse were presumed to be malicious. It was the defendant's
burden to rebut this presumption by a showing of privilege. The privilege was
considered to be either absolute or qualified, depending upon the situation.' If
the court found that the statements made were absolutely privileged, a judg-
ment for the defendant was given. However, if the statements were found to
be only qualifiedly privileged, the plaintiff could recover only if he proved
malice on the part of the defendant.8
Although a report of a legislative or judicial proceeding was generally con-
sidered to be qualifiedly privileged, the publisher in such a situation was held to
a somewhat higher standard. The plaintiff in such a suit was not required to
prove malice on the part of the defendant-publisher in order to recover for the
alleged libel; he needed only to prove the report was not fair or accurate.! Thus,
the reports, in order to remain privileged, could be neither prejudiced" nor par-
tial," but it was sufficient that they were substantially accurate summaries of
the proceedings.'" Some courts stated that the published report must be both
fair and impartial and without malice in order to be privileged." In such in-
stances the primary question was still whether the report was fair and accurate,
for if it were not, it would not be necessary to prove the malice element.
The courts continued to apply this higher standard to cases involving reports
of judicial proceedings and in fact such a standard was adopted by the writers
of the Restatement of Torts. Under this rule the accurate and fair report of a
generally unheard of, and libel was punishable by death. In addition, the unfortunate who
was tried for libel during this period was not allowed to assert the truth as a defense, an
idea that found its way over to the original American colonies. 1 A. HANSON, supra note 4,
at 6. It was not until the seditious libel trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 that the Amer-
ican courts recognized that the truth was indeed a defense. M. NEWELL, supra, at 26.
8 Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 41 L.Q. REV. 13,
14 (1925). It is difficult to place a precise time at which the courts recognized such distinc-
tion, for as one writer stated, the judges "decided the cases which arose as seemed to them
most expedient, and for reasons which seemed sufficient to dispose of the case in hand." Id.
However, it is generally conceded that such recognition came into being toward the latter
half of the seventeenth century. Id. at 16.
7The theory behind the absolute privilege was that the occasion was one on which all
persons should speak their minds fully and freely without fear of retribution via a libel suit.
The absolute privilege applied to proceedings of legislative bodies, judicial proceedings, and
utterances of military and naval officers. It did not extend to the reports of judicial proceed-
ings, but only to the statements made during the proceedings. M. NEWELL, supra note 5, at
418. The qualified privilege category extended to situations in which the speaker or publisher
was to be protected only so far as he was speaking honestly for the public good. Id. at 476.8 id. at 478.
'Two separate questions were put before the jury in such actions. (1) Was the report
fair and accurate? If so, it was prima facie privileged; if not, the verdict was for the plaintiff.
(2) Was the report, even though fair and accurate published maliciously? The second ques-
tion arose only if the first was answered in the affirmative. Id. at 558.
"'See, e.g., Robinson v. Johnson, 239 F. 671 (8th Cir. 1917); Atlanta News Publishing
Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756 (1905); Jones v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 240
Mo. 200, 144 S.W. 441 (1912); Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167,
191 A.2d 662 (1963); Brown v. Providence Telegram Publishing Co., 25 R.I. 117, 54 A.
1061 (1903).
nSee, e.g., Brown v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 213 Mo. 655, 112 S.W. 474
(1908); Metcalf v. Times Publishing Co., 20 R.I. 674, 40 A. 864 (1898).
"See, e.g., Boogher v. Knapp, 97 Mo. 122, 11 S.W. 45 (1889); Lehner v. Berlin Pub-
lishing Co., 209 Wis. 536, 245 N.W. 685 (1932).
" See, e.g., Henderson v. Evansville Press, Inc., 127 Ind. App. 592, 142 N.E.2d 920
(1957); Bock v. Plainfield Courier-News, 45 N.J. Super. 302, 132 A.2d 523 (1957).
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proceeding was privileged unless it was "made solely for the purpose of causing
harm to the person defamed."14 Thus, under the Restatement, as under the
common-law rule, a plaintiff need prove no more than that the defendant did
not publish a fair or accurate report in order to recover for libel.15
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE: NEW YORK TIMES Co. V. SULLIVAN
The application of these tort principles to the law of defamation continued
until 1964, when the United States Supreme Court decision of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan"4 thrust the constitutional issue into this area. ' The Court,
in reversing a decision for the plaintiff, announced the following principle:
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice'-that is, with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."1
The foremost issue in New York Times was whether the falsity of the
allegedly libelous statement caused a forfeiture of the constitutional protection
to which it otherwise would have been entitled. Answering this question in
the negative, the Court stated that it was considering the case "against the
background of a profound national commitment . . . that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . 1...9 A rule which re-
quires that the critics of official conduct guarantee the truth of their factual
assertions "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.""0 Such
a rule, the Court continued, "is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."1
The scope of the New York Times decision was subsequently expanded.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer"' the majority opinion stated that the New York Times
malice standard applies when the public has an "independent interest" in the
performance of the person who holds a government position, beyond the gen-
eral public interest in all government employees.1 In the consolidated cases of
14RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 611 (1938).
"The Restatement further states that it is not necessary that the report be exact in every
detail, but "li)t is enough that it convey . . . a substantially correct account." The report
may not, the comment continues, "after reporting derogatory parts, fail to publish the further
proceedings which vindicate the person defamed." Id., comment d at 611.
10376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17 Prior to New York Times libelous utterances were not within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). See also Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43, 48 (1960); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1957) (dictum); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (dictum).
18376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). The term "official conduct" was recently expanded in
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971): "[A] charge of criminal conduct,
no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candi-
date's fitness of office for purposes of application of the . . . rule of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan." See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
19 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
21Id. at 279.
21 Id.
'383 U.S. 75 (1966).
23 Id. at 86.
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Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker 4 the application
of the "actual malice" test was extended to public figures as well as public
officials. A significant attempt to formulate a practical explanation of the
"actual malice" standard was later made in St. Amant v. Thompson in which
the Court set forth a subjective standard, saying that "[tihere must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication, [and that] [plublishing with such
doubts ... demonstrates actual malice.
' 25
Courts are split on the issue of whether the holding in New York Times
applies to libel actions concerning reports of judicial proceedings. While
some courts have specifically applied the New York Times standard " and re-
quired a showing of malice before the plaintiff could recover,' others have
continued to apply the Restatement rule or state statutes and allow recovery
if the alleged libel was merely unfair and inaccurate. 8 One court has even
gone so far as to say that if the reports were fair and true, the privilege granted
was an absolute one and could not be defeated by a showing of malice even if
such a showing were possible."
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the Times standard is ap-
plicable to reports of judicial proceedings, although it has never rejected the
idea." In fact, language in St. Amant v.. Thompson" would tend to indicate
24388 U.S. 130 (1967). The public figure in the Butts case was an athletic director
and head football coach, while the public figure in the Walker case was a retired, yet still
well-known, General.
2"390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
2" The courts that have applied the New York Times standard have based their decisions
on the fact that the judicial proceeding either involved a public official or was of such nature
as to qualify as an issue of public interest. The Jones court, on the other hand, declined to
apply the New York Times standard regardless of the notoriety of the subject matter or
participants involved in the judicial proceedings. 463 S.W.2d at 95.
21 In Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1967), the
court examined the Restatement rule and concluded that it in fact did contain a requirement
of a showing of malice in order for the plaintiff to recover. The Restatement says that the
publication is privileged not only if it was accurate and fair, but also if it was not made
solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed. The court saw, in the latter
requirement, an element of malice. The court continued, saying that by either rule, Times
or Restatement, plaintiffs must prove actual malice in order to recover. See also Sellers
v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
28See, e.g., Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); McCracken v.
Evening News Ass'n, 3 Mich. App. 32, 141 N.W.2d 694 (1966); Binder v. Triangle Pub-
lications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971).
29 Hanft v. Heller, 64 Misc. 2d 947, 316 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
'Prosser states that the recent decision in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971),
indicates quite clearly that such a report, though inaccurate, is privileged unless maliciously
made. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 832 (4th ed. 1971). The opinion in Pape does
not indicate so clearly, however, the conclusion drawn by Prosser. Pape dealt with a Time
article written about a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. In applying
the New York Times rule, the Court created an important distinction between indirect and
direct accounts of events. The Court mentioned the possibility that a rule which permitted
recovery on the falsity of reports alone may be adequate when the alleged libel purports to
be an eyewitness or other direct account of events that speak for themselves. 401 U.S. at
285. However, the constitutional zone of protection of New York Times, stated the Court,
is applied when the report is derived indirectly (as through reports, speeches, press con-
ferences, etc.). Id. at 291. Thus, the question is whether a report of a judicial proceeding
would be classified as an indirect account, subject to the Times standard, or a direct account,
falling without the Times standard. Pape was decided too late to be considered by the Jones
court, although it appears that such a consideration would only have added perplexity to an
already bewildering problem.
31390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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that the court either meant for the Times standard to apply to such reports, or
would make such a decision if given the opportunity."2 If such a standard was
engrafted onto the law applicable to reports of judicial proceedings, it would,
of course, serve to protect a publisher in such a circumstance to the same de-
gree as if he were publishing a report on the actions of a public figure. The
publisher would, thus, be protected even if the report he published was inac-
curate, as long as he did not do so maliciously.
III. JONES V. COMMERCIAL PRINTING CO.
In Jones v. Commercial Printing Co." the Arkansas Supreme Court made
short work of the defendant's contention that the New York Times decision
was controlling. Although the court agreed that trials are often of considerable
public interest, it declined to accept the theory that the report was privileged
despite any incompleteness, partiality, or inaccuracies unless actual malice was
demonstrated.
"The lodestone of the New York Times decision and its progeny," stated the
court, "was protection and encouragement of freedom of speech and press."'84
The fear of a costly lawsuit would only discourage the press from reporting
the actions of public officials since many times even good faith investigative
efforts cannot assure absolute accuracy. In addition, as the Times Court
reasoned, public figures frequently have access to the news media through
which they may refute a report concerning their own actions. It was for these
reasons, according to Jones, that the Supreme Court in New York Times re-
quired the showing of malice as a prerequisite to recovery.
The court in Jones stated that this reasoning has little significance in rela-
tion to reports of judicial proceedings. Such reports, the court continued, are
always susceptible of exact reporting in that court records are always available.
Therefore, "the threat of a libel prosecution emanates only from incompetent
reporting."' Since, according to the court, it is always possible for a report to
be complete, impartial, and accurate, the court declined to require a showing
of malice regardless of the notoriety of the subject matter or the participants
involved in the judicial proceedings.
The reasoning of this court, and indeed the rationale behind its refusal to
apply New York Times, is not valid. The public of today demands instantaneous
reporting, and in order for a public journal to remain competitive it must re-
port the news as it is happening. Unfortunately court records are not so im-
mediately available and a public journal must rely on its reporters to interpret
accurately the proceedings at hand. Thus, in most instances the method of
reporting matters in a judicial proceeding is no different from that of reporting
public events, speeches by public officials, and the like. Why they should be
treated differently is unclear.
" The Court in St. Amant stated that "to insure the ascertainment and publication of the
truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous
publications as well as true ones." Id. at 732. The Court, it seems, is placing no limitation
on the type of publications that may fall under this constitutional safeguard.
81463 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1971).81 Id. at 95.
w Id.
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